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After fifty years of a career that ranged from physics to physiology, from optics to theories of artistic representation, Helmholtz more sensitively assessed Goethe=s aesthetic approach to nature. In this second essay, he emphasized a principle operative in Goethe=s work that I believe served as a fundamental organizing conception in the philosophy of the early Romantics. This was the aesthetic-epistemic principle of the complementarity of the poetic and scientific conceptions of nature.
Helmholtz came to agree with Goethe that "artistic representation" provided another way into the complexities of the physical world. 8 Both aesthetic intuition and scientific comprehension drove down to the type, to the underlying force that gave form to the surface of things. Exercising aesthetic intuition within the realm of science, therefore,
would not introduce anything foreign, but only aid the scientist in comprehending the fundamental structures and powers of nature.
Helmholtz was unaware of the metaphysical and epistemological barriers Goethe had to overcome in order to establish the principal of complementarity. Once established, the principal became instrumental, not only in smoothing the way for
Darwin, but allowing Goethe himself to move along the path on which the Englishman would later travel. The barriers that Goethe initially encountered derived from Kant. As the result of urging by his friend, the poet Friedrich Schiller, Goethe became grudgingly convinced of the Kantian epistemology, which seemed to block access to the real world.
The escape route, however, came through the intellectual aid provided by another friend, the young idealist philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Goethe and Schelling became quite close, and each had a marked impact on the thought of the other. Schelling led 4 his older mentor beyond Kant and ultimately to the kind of evolutionary theory that Kant had rejected; Goethe, in his turn, helped anchor Schelling=s drifting idealism. Let me initially make clear the dimensions of the Kantian obstacles before I undertake to examine how Goethe=s young protégé showed the way back into the heart of nature.
Goethe=s Kantian Problems
By reason of inveterate attitude and poetic disposition, Goethe strongly inclined toward realism. His poetry expressed the immediate experience of nature and attempted to recreate that experience for the reader. During the 1780s, while a civil administrator for Carl August, duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, the young poet became devoted to Spinoza. Under the tutelage of his friend Johann Gottlieb Herder, Goethe, in the company of the enticing Charlotte von Stein, undertook a systematic study of the philosopher, who inspired him to explore empirical phenomena in order to discover those adequate ideas that determined the essential structures of natural objects.
Archetypes of plants and animals, Goethe became convinced, animated nature; and he believed scientific experiment and systematic observation might bring those structures to intuitive recognition. This kind of rationalistic realism, though, met a formidable challenge.
In 1789, Goethe undertook a study of Kant=s first Critique with the help of Karl Leonhard Reinhold, the principal supporter of Kant in the philosophy faculty at Jena. 9 The poet, though, stumbled over the book=s principal epistemological position, namely that an impenetrable barrier stood between the mind and the world beyond. Initially, as 5 he recalled, "sometimes my poetical abilities hindered me, sometimes my mundane understanding, and I felt I had not gotten very far." 10 Goethe=s marginalia and notes indicate clearly enough that he understood Kant=s claim; he did not appreciate, though, the rationale for the claim. 11 While traveling in Italy during the two-year period 1786-1788, Goethe became convinced that he had solved a deep problem in biology, and when he returned to Weimar he began working on a tract to explain his discovery. His Metamorphose der Pflanzen (1790) describes the development of plants in terms of an ideal structure that expresses the essence of all plants. Yet this archetype, as Goethe construed it, served not only as an ideal type but also as a force actually productive of natural organisms.
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Over this discovery the Kantian pall likewise fell: How could one be sure the archetypal idea corresponded with anything real, with a force actually resident in nature?
Goethe=s hesitating difficulties with Kant, however, became initially blanketed in a cloud of enthusiasm when he took up, in 1790, the newly published Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of judgment). He thought that this new critique specified in a most perspicuous 6 way the connection between aesthetic judgment and biological judgment. It showed explicitly what Goethe knew implicitly to be right, namely, the existence of an intimate relationship between the realm of art and the realm of science. The Critique also offered to Goethe the confirmation that the work of art and the product of nature both existed in their own right and for themselves. Organisms might be shaped by the external environment, but their internal structures were neither explained nor justified by that environment nor by any other external cause, human or divine. The Critique=s analysis also freed art from the oppression of final causes: art objects had aesthetic value independently of their moral worth, theological subject, or decorative character. 13 Yet in the midst of philosophical plenty, Goethe again collided with the Kantian barrier, now blocking two avenues. Kant would allow archetypal ideas-such as that of the ideal plant or the vertebrate structure-and even grant the naturalist could assume these archetypes had creative efficacy; but they could only function, according to Kant, als ob, that is, they could only serve as regulative heuristics. We might assume an archetypal intellect created natural objects, but this assumption could have no purchase on nature or valid science. Goethe yet believed these ideals operated as real causes.
Further, the Königsberg sage had refused to recognize a natural process of which the poet had become convinced-the evolutionary transition of species.
These, then, are some of the difficulties that Goethe faced. The individual who did the most to convince him of the power of the Kantian view was his close friend, the Genius is the inborn mental trait (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art." 18 The definition suggested to Schiller that ineffable rules for the creation of beauty arose from the artist=s nature, which was of a piece with nature writ large. In producing a painting or sculpture, for instance, the artist of genius plays with certain forms in imagination. In this free play, according to Kant, certain expressions will seem aesthetically right; and the artist will experience aesthetic pleasure as he or she renders the artistic object. The harmony of forms and the pleasure they induce would be, in 
Goethe=s Morphology
In 1794, just after he had established his friendship with Schiller, Goethe we should not marvel at a superior wisdom that supposedly designed the bark of the cork tree so fine wines could be preserved; rather we should try to understand how that part functioned within the organization of the tree itself and how it was affected by 11 its geographical circumstances. The relationship of organisms to their environment, according to Goethe, had to be regarded as non-intentional: the environment had an impact on creatures, changing their outward shape to conform to particular requirements, giving an organism "its purposiveness in respect to that external environment [seine Zweckmässigkeit nach aussen]." But that was only part of the story; for the internal structures of plants and animals showed another force at work.
There was also an "inner kernel [innere Kern]" that provided a general corporeal pattern for an organism, which extrinsic forces might particularize in different ways:
the seal, for instance, had a body formed by its aquatic environment, but its skeleton displayed the same general configuration as that of land mammals. Goethe thus concluded:
The ultimate form [of a plant or animal] is constructed likewise from an inner kernel, which is given its particularity through the determination of external elements. In this way, an animal obtains its purposiveness in respect to the outer environment, since it is formed from the external as well as from the internal. 20 Living organisms thus derived their structures from two forces, an intrinsic one, which provided a general pattern [Muster] , and an extrinsic one, which shaped an organism to its particular circumstances. This latter, environmental force, Goethe conceived much as Lamarck and Darwin would, namely, as a direct effect on the organism that adapted it to particular circumstances ("purposiveness in respect to that external environment"). Goethe had replaced divine teleology with natural causality, though a 12 causality that yet retained a telic feature. Some time later, Georges Cuvier and Richard Owen would reach comparable conclusions, though they still detected the ultimate intentions of the Creator expressed in such proximate causes.
From 1794 argued that the theory of the archetype did not rest on mere hypothesis, since it followed from "the concept of a living, determined, independent, and spontaneously effective natural being." 21 Such a being would have its parts mutually dependent upon one another and comprehensible only in relation to the whole. Now, of course, Kant held much the same, though he specified that such a teleological concept, while characteristic of the human mode of thought, was only regulative, not determinative of external nature. For Kant the concept of a living being simply could not function-as
Goethe thought it must-in authentic science, which could only refer to mechanical causes in the explanation of natural phenomena. Goethe used the Kantian framework, nonetheless, to picture another conception, which he put this way:
We are thus assured [by reason of our concept] of the unity, variety, purposiveness, and lawfulness of our object. If we are thoughtful and forceful enough to approach our object and to consider and treat it with a simple, though comprehensive mode of representation [Vorstellungsart], 13 one that is lawfully free [gesetzmässig-freien], lively, yet regular-if we are in a position, employing the mental powers that one usually calls genius (which often produces rather dubious effects), to penetrate to the certain and unambiguous genius of productive nature-then, we should be able to apply this meaning of unity in multiplicity to this tremendous object. If we do so, then something must arise with which we as men ought to be delighted. In the near term, though, the young philosopher secured the lines of Goethe=s drifting metaphysical views, providing many of his instinctive attitudes hard rational demonstrations, while shifting others into more dangerous currents. And the reciprocal pull on Schelling=s own philosophy was hardly less dramatic.
During Schelling=s years in Jena, he and Goethe met frequently to discuss philosophical, scientific, and artistic matters. Goethe-the poet, scientist, and Weimar genius-like a whirlpool of creative energy carried the young philosopher into the center of his interests and flooded him with re-orienting conceptions. His diverting power had its effect almost immediately. In the winter term 1798-1799, Schelling began lecturing at Jena on Naturphilosophie, lectures which would yield during Eastertide his Erster Entwurf zu einem System der Naturphilosophie (First sketch of a system of nature philosophy). In November, he and Goethe met to discuss the character of Naturphilosophie, and particularly the problems of organic metamorphosis. 34 After the publication of his lectures, Schelling, under the influence of Goethe, felt the need to clarify and develop an aspect of Naturphilosophie that he had neglected, namely the role of experiment and observation. During a particularly intense period, from the 20 middle of September to the middle of October 1799, the two met almost daily to discuss this problem, and together they spent almost a week going over Schelling=s Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (Introduction to the sketch of a system of nature philosophy). 35 Schelling proclaimed that the conversations had produced a great "florescence of ideas" for him. 36 The Einleitung stated unequivocally the necessity of experiment in discovering the laws of nature. And indeed, Schellingthe knight errant of idealism-proclaimed that "all of our knowledge stems from The System began as a series of lectures Schelling gave in winter term 1799-1800 and published at Easter. He sent Goethe a copy, and the poet immediately responded that as far as he had quickly read, he thought he understood his young friend=s argument. He was sure that "in this kind of presentation, there would be great advantage for anyone who was inclined to practice art and observe nature." 46 Goethe could rarely be moved to dispense patronizing flattery, and this certainly was not a case. (i.e., "the inborn mental trait (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art") 48 to mean that the artist=s unconscious nature determines those principles of beauty that express themselves in non-conceptual feelings, which, in turn, drive conscious actions. 49 The artist applies paint to canvas not in light of a conscious set of rules but by relying on aesthetic feeling-the palpable surface of underlying unconscious lawsto guide the brush. In Schelling=s view, the inarticulable laws governing an aesthetic production surge forth with irresistible determinacy from the unconscious nature of the genius. These laws, or rules, must be followed. Yet every necessary blow of the sculptor=s chisel, every perfect metaphor of the poet, nonetheless flow from the free will of the genius. Insistent forces thus well up from the unconscious nature of the artist and rush in turbulent cascades through the narrows of consciousness. This creates, according to Schelling, violent eddies of contradiction that "set in motion the artistic 24 urge." 50 Such contradictions can only be calmed in the execution of the work of art. As the artist comes to rest in the finished, objective product, he or she will sense the union of nature and self, of necessity and freedom, of-finally-the unconscious and the conscious self. Thus will the goal of transcendental philosophy be reached: what is originally an identical self-fragmented, as it were, through a kind of dialectical development in which self-reflection issues in the subjective structures of intelligence and the objective structures of nature-that one self will have returned to its original identity. The intelligence "will feel surprised and very happy by this union, that is, it will see this union as a generous gift of a higher nature, which through this connection has made the impossible possible."
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In his analysis of the nature of artistic genius, Schelling attempted to portray, in another key, the creative essence of the self, as it constructed both itself and nature. Goethe mentioned in his letter that he had been taking instruction in the new idealism with Niethammer (who was in the philosophy faculty at Jena). The two met almost daily for a month, from early September to early October 1800. 55 After
Schelling returned in the fall to Weimar, his philosophical élan slowly died away and was replaced by a growing depression over the death of Auguste. By Christmas he was in such a state that Caroline believed he might commit suicide, and she arranged for
Goethe to take in her despairing lover. Schelling spent the Christmas holiday with
Goethe, who apparently wrought the right kind of psychological cure. Schelling 26 recovered, and his gratitude for Goethe=s personal solicitude mixed sweetly with admiration for the older man=s genius. 56 When Schelling lectured on the philosophy of art shortly thereafter, he did not hesitate to proclaim the poet=s Faust "nothing else than the most intrinsic, purest essence of our age." 57 While Schelling remained at Weimar, he and Goethe continued to meet; they would discuss the philosopher=s new projects, projects, such as the Bruno, which gave forceful and fairly accessible expression to the Spinozistic identity theory that Schelling was developing-a theory certainly encouraged by Goethe. 
Schelling=s Resolutions of Goethe=s Kantian Problems
First, and most importantly, Schelling=s philosophical view, especially as developed in his System des transscendentalen Idealismus, theoretically demonstrated that scientific understanding and artistic intuition did not play out in opposition to one another, as Goethe once thought, but that they reflected complementary modes of penetrating to nature=s underlying laws. For Goethe this liberated his sense of the 27 intimate connection between the scientific and the artistic approaches to nature, which he consequently expressed, as was his wont, in a poem-Natur und Kunst (Nature and art)-that he composed at this time:
Nature and art, they seem each other to repel Yet, they fly together before one is aware;
The antagonism has departed me as well,
And now both of these seem to me equally fair. Ding-an-sich standing behind the construction. Nature really was as she appeared to be. So the bright colors and forms that dazzled the eye were not meretricious and superficial traits-they inhered in nature. In Schelling=s view the true idealism was the most authentic realism. Moreover, as Schelling drove his philosophy to an absolute ideal-realism, his position merged with that of Spinoza: the ideas that constituted nature=s creations were not captives of individual minds, but stood beyond empirical self and nature, though were realized in both. Hence the solution to the puzzle of Goethe=s epigram that "an unknown, law-like something in the object corresponds to an unknown, law-like something in the subject." 64 The connection between object and subject occurred through the organic activity of absolute mind and its ideas, which latter functioned as those archetypal concepts at the foundations of morphology.
Schelling=s impact on Goethe reverberated through the years, and again became particularly manifest during the time he worked on Zur Morphologie, beginning in 1817.
The essay "Anschaundende Urteilskraft" ("Intuitive judgment," 1820) provides a good example of this lasting influence. The essay returns to Kant=s third Critique, as Goethe himself did at this time, to consider the philosopher=s distinction between reflective and determinative judgment. It will be recalled that Kant classified judgments of beauty and judgments appropriate to biology (ends-means assessments) as reflective. Such judgments arose in attempting to understand the relationship of parts to whole, either in a work of art or a work of nature. In our appreciation of an art object, our understanding considers its various parts, allowing the free play of imagination to get a sense of the harmony of forms, a feeling of purposiveness in their arrangement; such feelings 30 express those inarticulable ideas of beauty and allow the necessity and universality of the aesthetic judgment. Likewise, when the biologist assess the traits of an organism, the same reflective procedure occurs: through an initial exploration of the parts, he
formulates an idea of the whole-though a conscious and articulable one, an archetype-and thereby understands the organism=s traits in relation to the whole.
Indeed, the student of nature must, according to Kant, judge the structures investigated as if they came to exist by reason of the idea or archetype. But in this instance, the biologist makes only a heuristic assessment, and does not-cannot-presume the idea at which he arrives to have actually caused the structure. The scientist, according to Kant, ought make determinative attributions only of mechanical causes, not of intentional causes, to explain natural phenomena.
In our scientific understanding of nature, according to the Kantian system, we apply categories like causality and substance determinatively to create, as it were, the phenomenal realm of mechanistically interacting natural objects. But in considering biological organisms, we must initially analyze the parts in reflective search of that organizing idea that might illuminate their relationships. But Kant suggested that we could conceive of another kind of intellect, one other than ours, which might move from the intuition of the whole to that of the constituents, instead of following our path from parts to whole. This would then be an intellectus archetypus, whose very idea would be creative. Concerning this Kantian notion, Goethe made a trenchant and many-layered observation:
The author seems here, indeed, to refer to a divine understanding. Yet, if 31 in the moral realm we are supposed to rise to a higher region and approach the primary Being through belief in God, virtue, and immortality, then it also should be the same in the intellectual realm. We ought to be worthy, through the intuition of a continuously creative nature, of mental participation in its productivity. I myself had incessantly pushed, initially unconsciously and from an inner drive, to the primal image [Urbildliche] and type [Typische] . Fortune smiled on this effort and I was able to construct a representation in a natural way; so now nothing more can prevent me from boldly undertaking that "adventure of reason," as the grand old man from Königsberg himself has called it. 65 In this passage and in the brief essay from which it comes, Goethe attempted to muscle into philosophical acceptance a thesis similar to one of Schelling: namely, if moral experience required us to postulate God to make sense of that experience, then our experience of organisms should also require us to postulate an intellectual intuition to make sense of such experience. 66 But Goethe suggested that this would occur in two ways: first would be the intellectually intuitive action of nature-the assumption that nature herself, through a kind of instantiation of archetypal ideals, would create organisms according to such ideals. Here Goethe seems to allude to the Spinozistic notion of adequate ideas that themselves would be creative. The second construction that Goethe put on Kant's conception was that we also might share in this kind of intellectual intuition, presumably as the artist who created an aesthetic object and also as the scientist who penetrated the veil of nature to intuitively understand the archetypal 32 unity underlying its variegated displays. Like Schelling, Goethe thus implied that if archetypal ideas were necessary for our experience of organic nature, then they had to be causal constituents of that experience-mentally creative of that experience. And there was the further implication of this analysis, namely that in such mental creations we shared in nature=s own generative power-indeed, that we become identified with nature in such activity. Goethe thus reaffirmed a Schellingian Spinozism: God, nature, and our intellect were one.
Goethe=s final remark in the quotation above draws out the ultimate consequence of this ideal-realism. In the third Critique, Kant recognized that the variety of organic forms yet displayed "a common archetype [einem gemeinschaftlichen Urbilde]," and thus might be produced, as he put it, by "a common primal mother." This might lead to undertaking "a daring adventure of reason," namely, the belief that the earth had given birth to less-purposive forms and these to more-purposive, till the array of currently existing organisms appeared. Kant thought this transformational hypothesis would be logically possible if we initially assumed the initiating cause of the series was itself organic. He yet rejected this evolutionary hypothesis because he did not think we had any empirical evidence of the generation of a more organized form from a less organized one. 67 Schelling=s theory of dynamic evolution, which Goethe accepted, postulated an organic foundation (i.e., absolute mind) for a transformational series; and by the time of the Zur Morphologie, researchers had accumulated fossil evidence of such transformations (e.g., the Megatherium). Goethe was thus ready, as he concluded, boldly to undertake that adventure of reason of which the Königsberg sage 33 had spoken.
The evolutionary hypothesis as applied to nature reflected Goethe=s own mental evolution: the Zur Morphologie tracked the gradual ascent of his morphological ideas, and those ideas gave rise to the transformational hypothesis he rather boldly embraced in the book. 68 The metaphysical foundation, for Goethe, of these two evolutionary series-of the self and of nature-rested ultimately on the kind of ideal-realism for which
Schelling had argued and which Goethe embraced.
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